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A recent rash of near mid-air collisions coupled with the widespread proliferation of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS)
raise concerns that integration is posing additional risk to the National Airspace System. In 2016, sUAS sighting reports by manned
aircraft pilots averaged 147 per month. In the first three quarters of 2017, sUAS sightings jumped to 188 per month. The purpose of
this study was to evaluate sUAS operator behavior to determine potential interference with aviation operations. While previous
research has indeed yielded findings about operator behavior, such studies were generally based on data derived from Aviation
Safety Reporting System filings or the UAS sighting report database maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration. In this
study, the authors partnered with a UAS technology company to deploy an AeroScope, a passive radiofrequency detection device,
to detect UAS flight activity in an urban area. While the device was limited to collecting flight information from only DJI-
manufactured platforms, it is estimated that the company holds a market share in excess of 70% providing a reasonable barometer
for sUAS activity in the sample area. Over the 19-day sample period, the AeroScope device recorded 258 detections of 77 unique
sUAS platforms. The authors assessed sUAS operator behavioral characteristics, including: UAS models, operating altitudes,
preferred flying days and times, flight durations, and operating locations. The authors assessed 93 potential violations of 14 CFR
107 regulations, including controlled airspace breaches, exceeding maximum flight altitudes, and flight outside of daylight or civil
twilight hours. The authors concluded that UAS activity in the sample area posed potential conflicts with a runway visual approach,
created a collision hazard with three heliports, and heightened risk for visual flight rules operations underneath a controlled airspace
shelf. The authors determined existing sUAS geofencing systems were ineffective at deterring sUAS activity unless they imposed
flight restrictions in addition to hazard notification.
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Introduction
As of October 31, 2017, there were 836,796 hobbyists
registered as model aircraft operators in the United States
(Gettinger & Michel, 2017). The hobbyist fleet of unman-
ned aircraft is forecasted to top 2.4 million by 2022
(Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2018). Similarly,
the population of commercial unmanned aerial system
(UAS) platforms is expected to increase from 110,604 at
the end of 2017 to 450,000 by 2022 (FAA, 2018). With
the rapid rise in both hobbyist and commercial UAS,
there has been a corresponding uptick in near encounters
between unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft. In 2016, the
FAA received 1,762 reports of UAS sightings by aircrew
members, representing an average sighting rate of 147
incidents per month (FAA, 2019). By September 2017, there
had been 1,699 reported UAS sightings, representing an
average of 188 incidents per month (FAA, 2019).
Perhaps more alarming than the raw number of
unmanned aircraft sightings by manned aircraft are the
locations of these sightings. In a study by Gettinger and
Michel (2015), of the 921 reported UAS sightings between
December 17, 2013 and September 12, 2015, more than
90% occurred in areas where unmanned aircraft were
forbidden. Gettinger and Michel (2015) determined that
90.2% (n 5 708, N 5 785 in which altitude was reported)
of encounters occurred more than 400 ft above ground level
(AGL), and 58.8% (n 5 391) occurred within 5 mi of an
airport. In 17% (n 5 158) of the incidents, manned and
unmanned aircraft came within 200 ft or less of each other.
The highest number of incidents generally occurred in large
urban areas between the hours of 10:00am and 6:00pm
(Gettinger & Michel, 2015).
A subsequent archival study using Aviation Safety
Reporting System data from 1993 to 2016 revealed that
96.5% (n 5 164) of reported UAS incidents occurred
within controlled or special use airspace (Sharma, 2016).
This seems to confirm the findings of Gettinger and Michel
(2015), which suggested that a substantial number of
incidents were clustered around large urban locations—
many of which are encompassed within highly congested
Class B or C airspace. In the Gettinger and Michel (2015)
study, nearly 9.3% (n 5 86) of the 921 incidents recorded
occurred within the Class B airspace surrounding Newark
Airport, New Jersey. At least 39 reported UAS encounters
occurred in Los Angeles, which has high-traffic Class B
airspace around Los Angeles International Airport, as well
as four additional airports surrounded by congested Class C
airspace (Gettinger & Michel, 2015). Of the 39 reported
UAS sightings in Los Angeles, 17 occurred within 10 mi of
the approach paths to runways 25L and 25R (Gettinger &
Michel, 2015).
The increased numbers of aircraft encounters with UAS
have gained FAA attention, and in October of 2015,
the agency partnered with CACI International to evaluate
technological solutions to detect and identify unmanned
aircraft operating around airports (FAA, 2016a). Between
January 25 and February 2, 2016, the agency conducted
testing of a CACI radiofrequency detection system at
Atlantic City International Airport along the eastern sea-
board of New Jersey (FAA, 2016a). Atlantic City lies
within Class C airspace, less than 40 nautical miles from
Philadelphia International Airport and 80 nautical miles
from JFK International Airport in New York. During the
five-day test, the CACI system detected a total of 141 UAS
operations, which included 72 indications of UAS activation
on the ground and 69 UAS platforms in flight (FAA, 2016a).
Purpose
This research was the first of a series of studies the
authors performed to assess the extent of the problem of
unmanned aircraft flight interference with aviation opera-
tions. In this study, the authors sought to quantify the
number of unmanned aircraft flights near airports in and
around congested Class B airspace. The authors compared
detected aircraft flight patterns and observations against
local aeronautical information, such as aerodromes, traffic
patterns, approaches, and other related information, to
present potential or realized interference created by unman-
ned aircraft flight patterns. Additionally, the authors exami-
ned UAS operator launch locations to identify common
characteristics and flight location favorability factors.
Finally, the authors evaluated the number of small UAS
(sUAS) flights that occurred despite geofencing restric-
tions. This research differs from previous studies because
the researchers did not perform proof-of-concept or pene-
tration testing. Data collected during this study represented
actual UAS operations in the test area—none of which were
influenced by the research team.
Research Questions
The authors sought to answer the following research
questions:
1. What are common characteristics of UAS flight
locations?
2. What are common characteristics of UAS operations
(including UAS platform type, date/time of opera-
tion, flight duration, and maximum altitude)?
3. What is the potential impact of detected unmanned air-
craft activity on aerodromes and aviation operations?
4. How effective are geofencing restrictions in prevent-
ing UAS flights into protected areas?
Literature Review
In 2017, UAS manufacturer DJI unveiled a device
known as the AeroScope, which detects, identifies, and
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monitors unmanned aircraft (see Figure 1). The AeroScope
is a passive radiofrequency sensor that eavesdrops on
existing datalinks between DJI unmanned aircraft and
remote pilot controllers, and displays and records their
flight information (DJI, 2017a). The AeroScope collects
telemetry of DJI UAS platform activity within electronic
line of sight, including location of the unmanned vehicle,
location of the remote controller, flight path, altitude,
speed, direction, and other parametric details (DJI,
2017a).
To aid UAS operators in determining where it is safe to
fly, DJI incorporates GEO zone—more commonly refer-
red to as geofencing—restrictions into its programming.
DJI (n.d.) describes the role of GEO zones on the com-
pany’s website:
DJI’s GEO System delineates where it is safe to fly,
where flight may raise concerns, and where flight is
restricted. GEO zones that prohibit flight are implemen-
ted around locations such as airports, power plants, and
prisons. They are also implemented temporarily around
major stadium events, forest fires, or other emergency
situations. Certain GEO zones don’t prohibit flight,
but do trigger warnings that inform users of potential
risks. (p. 1)
The GEO zone system restricts UAS operations within or
into areas that would create a security or safety risk (DJI,
n.d.). For areas that do not involve national security, users are
capable of self-authorizing flights by unlocking restrictions
via a verified DJI account (DJI, n.d.). DJI’s GEO zones offer
four categories of protection:
Warning Zones: Users are prompted with a warning
message in the UAS user interface regarding operations
in a specified area (DJI, n.d.).
Enhanced Warning Zones: Users are prompted with a
warning message in the UAS user interface and flight is
restricted. This limitation may be overridden by the user
in the user interface (DJI, n.d.).
Authorization Zones: Areas are displayed in yellow and
users are prompted with a warning message in the UAS
user interface and flight is restricted. This limitation may
be overridden by the user by overriding the restrictions
with a verified DJI account (DJI, n.d.).
Restricted Zones: Areas are displayed in red and users
are prompted with a warning message in the UAS user
interface and flight is prevented. Unlock access is only
available via coordination with DJI (DJI, n.d.).
Restricted Zones come in two variants—Airport
Restricted Zones and other Restricted Zones. Airport
Restricted Zones are modeled with an interior, circular
perimeter that prohibits takeoff and flight within an
established radius of the center point. According to DJI
(2017b), the radius of the interior perimeter ‘‘depends on
the size and shape of the airport’’ (p. 59). Beyond the radius
of the interior Airport Restricted Zone, flight is limited to
an altitude of 66 ft (20 m) and extending outward at a 15˚
inclination up to a maximum of 1,640 ft and out to a
Figure 1. (Left) Permanent AeroScope radiofrequency detection device. (Right) Mobile AeroScope in Pelican case. Images courtesy of FLYMOTION.
Used with permission.
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distance of 1 mi (DJI, 2017b). Within 0.062 mi (100 m) of
the aerial vehicle approaching a restricted zone, the operator
will receive an alert message on the DJI user interface (DJI,
2017b). Conversely, a Restricted Zone is established for
other protected areas. These zones do not have altitude
restrictions and extend outward to form a circular perimeter,
which may vary based on the established restriction. Similar
to Airport Restricted Zones, users receive an alert when
the aerial vehicle approaches within 0.062 mi (500 m) of a
Restricted Zone.
Method
This applied research project used a combination of
exploratory research and case study design methodology.
The authors partnered with a UAS technology company to
secure access to a DJI AeroScope. The authors evaluated
data collected over a 19-day period by the DJI AeroScope,
which was deployed at an elevation of 45 ft AGL atop
a commercial building in Tampa, Florida. The authors
examined detected UAS information including the type
and number of individual platform detections, detection
location, maximum flight altitude, flight duration, and time
of operation to form conclusions about UAS operator
behavior. Altitude data were recorded in mean sea level
(MSL) for consistency and, when required, were converted
to AGL. The authors analyzed collected information
by plotting detection location using Google Earth Pro.
Geolocation data were converted to compatible KML
format using EasyMapMaker, an online geolocation tool
designed to create custom Google maps. Aeronautical chart
data were extracted from the Tampa Terminal Area Chart
obtained from the FAA Sectional Aeronautical Raster
Charts website. Aeronautical information regarding private
heliports was acquired from the AirNav website. Additional
geolocation information regarding geofencing data was
acquired from the DJI Fly Safe Geo Zone Map website.
Findings and Discussion
The AeroScope collected data from February 18, 2018
to March 2, 2018 and again from March 23 to 28, 2018.
Detection ranged between 0.01 statute miles (SM) to as
far away as 10.78 SM from the AeroScope deployment
location. More than 95% of the detections were located
within 6.0 SM of the AeroScope device.
Platform Type
The AeroScope detected 77 unique platforms which
included 2 Matrice (200-series only), 5 Inspire (all models),
22 Phantom 4 (all variants), 4 Phantom 3 (all variants), 27
Mavic Pro, 14 Spark, and 3 unknown platforms. A census
of detected models is depicted in Figure 2.
Individual Detections
During the sampling period, the AeroScope recorded
320 UAS detections. A detection is defined as a unique
exposure that produced a separate log in the AeroScope
data. Each detection included a defined start and stop time.
An overview of UAS detections is provided in Figure 3.
In some cases, detections were not continuous. This
likely occurred when a sUAS flight was landed for a
battery swap or when an obstruction between the sUAS
and AeroScope interrupted receipt of the datalink com-
munication signal.
Of the 320 original detections, 50 logs were removed
because they lacked location information. An additional
12 logs were removed because they fell outside the
geographical area of the AeroScope deployment loca-
tion due to the AeroScope being temporarily used by the
company for a roadshow demonstration. The findings
were modified to accurately reflect collection dates. The
remaining 258 logs formed the basis of the data analysis.
Figure 2. Census of detected platforms by model.
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Detections by Day of Week
The researchers aggregated the daily results based on
the number of sampled days, yielding a daily average. The
average daily detection rate is presented in Figure 4.
Using historical data, researchers assessed weather data
including wind, visibility, and precipitation to determine
days in which adverse weather was likely to influence
UAS flight. Over the course of the 19-day sampling
period, the weather was extremely stable, with wind
less than 10 knots, visibility greater than 5 SM, and a
maximum of 0.1 inches of daily precipitation (Weather
Underground, 2018). Based on these findings, the
researchers assessed that weather conditions were generally
favorable for UAS flight throughout the testing period.
Detection Time
UAS flights were detected between 5:32am and 11:31pm
local time. Figure 5 depicts the distribution of UAS flights
by detection time.
Based on the collected data, the authors determined that
two UAS flights were conducted prior to the civil twilight
window—one at 6:19am on March 24 and one at 5:32am
on February 25. At least 40 UAS detections occurred
after the period in which civil twilight ended (FAA, n.d.a).
This culminates in 16.3% (n 5 42) of total UAS detections
occurring outside of 14 CFR 107.29 limitations.
Maximum Altitude
The maximum altitude of detected UAS flights ranged
from 0 to 1,606 ft MSL. Note that DJI UAS platforms are
limited to a maximum flight altitude of 1,640 ft (500 m),
based on programmed flight limitations. The AeroScope
recorded a maximum altitude of 0 ft for 50 of the 258
data points. Of the 258 data points, 81.0% (n 5 209)
recorded a maximum altitude of 400 ft or less. Nineteen
percent (n 5 49) of UAS flights were conducted in
excess of 400 ft MSL. The highest reported airfield
elevation within the data coverage area was 26 ft MSL
at Tampa International Airport. When integrating the
26-foot MSL correction, 47 flights were conducted above
Figure 3. Detection count by unique platform.
Figure 4. Average number of detections per day.
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426 ft MSL (approximately 400 ft AGL), exceeding sUAS
maximum altitude requirements codified in 14 CFR
107.51(b) (without regard sub-provisions 1 & 2). At least
11.6% (n 5 30) of the UAS sorties were conducted above
526 ft MSL (approximately 500 ft AGL)—the lowest
altitude over non-congested areas at which manned aircraft
can fly, based on 14 CFR 91.119 rules. The distribution of
detected maximum flight altitudes is presented in Figure 6.
Flight Duration
The flight duration of detected platforms ranged between
0 and 3,338 s (55:38). Of the 258 data points, 80 recorded a
flight duration of 0 s. The mean flight duration was 113 s
with the median flight duration being 31 s. When assessed
with all durations of 0 s removed, the mean flight time
was 161 s (2:41), and the median time was 62 s (1:02).
The distribution of UAS flight durations is presented in
Figure 7. This was an unexpected finding, considering
the endurance of most DJI platforms exceeds 25 min. One
possible explanation for this finding is that the sUAS
passed out of the AeroScope’s electronic line of sight prior
to the conclusion of the flight.
Flight Duration Proportion of Design Maximum
Since flight duration is a function of platform capabilities
such as battery capacity, flight characteristics, weight, and
other factors, flight duration data were further assessed by
platform type. Results are presented in Figure 8. Table 1
depicts mean and median flight durations for each plat-
form type, as well as maximum flight durations, based on
Figure 5. Detection distribution by time of day. All times in 24-hour format, local time.
Figure 6. Maximum altitude of detected UAS sorties.
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information derived from the DJI product specifications
website. A reasonable estimation of average power utiliza-
tion can be derived from the Percent of Maximum category
in Table 1. Figure 9 depicts the distribution of detected UAS
flight durations by platform as a function of the platform’s
maximum flight time specifications reported by DJI.
Operating Location
The authors assessed the locations where detected
UAS were operated using a descriptive categorization
taxonomy. Figure 10 depicts sUAS detections within the
sample area, with an accompanying heat map showing
the density of sUAS detections. Four researchers indepen-
dently coded the 258 locations with coding results correlated
to improve accuracy. Findings indicated that 38% (n 5
97)—the largest proportion of UAS operators—flew in
proximity to single-family structures. At least 27% (n 5
69) of detected UAS flights were conducted near commercial
or industrial locations. Such flights were generally initiated
from parking lots or other open areas near these facili-
ties. It is also notable that 12% (n 5 32) of UAS flights
occurred on public property, such as roadways or public
parks. The remaining 23% of UAS detections were
Figure 7. Duration of detected UAS sorties (in seconds). Note: major axis marks are presented in 60-second (1-minute) intervals.
Figure 8. Duration of detected UAS sorties (in seconds) by platform model. Note: major axis marks are presented in 10-minute (600-second) intervals.
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made over unimproved land, waterways, multi-family
homes, stadiums, and other uncategorized structures.
A complete assessment of operator locations is provided
in Figure 11.
Aeronautical Impact Assessment
Of the 258 data points, two sUAS appeared to penetrate
the Tampa International Airport Class B surface area (see
Figure 12). Two additional aircraft penetrated the Tampa
Class B shelf at the 1,600 and 1,400 ft levels. While Peter
O. Knight Airport lies in Class G airspace, there was substan-
tial UAS activity (more than 60 detections) within 3 SM
of the airfield. While not depicted on the Tampa Terminal
Area Chart, it was notable that a substantial number of UAS
detections (60) occurred within 2 SM of three clustered heli-
ports (54FL, FL70, and 61FL). Another heliport of concern
was 9FD6, for which 46 detections were made within a 2 SM
radius. The Mezrah private seaplane base also had a notable
number of UAS detections (16) within a 1.5 SM radius.
The interior ring of the Tampa Class B shelf compresses
certain general aviation operations below 1,200 ft east of
Tampa International Airport and MacDill AFB. Coupled
with the finding that 11.6% of UAS flights occurred above
500 ft AGL, these conditions suggest that near encounters
between manned and unmanned aircraft are likely as
non-compliant UAS operations encroach into this con-
gested airspace.
Clustering of unmanned aircraft activity occurs 1.4 SM
north of Peter O. Knight Airfield, and aligning directly with
a visual approach to Runway 18, as presented in Figures 13
and 14. Trigonometric calculation of a standard 3˚ glide-
slope to the Runway 18 threshold suggests that at a distance
of 1.4 SM, a descending aircraft would be at an altitude
of approximately 387 ft AGL. Within the cluster area,
researchers counted 17 UAS detections that occurred
between 300 and 400 ft AGL. It is likely that visual detec-
tion of a sUAS during this approach would be problematic,
as an encounter would likely occur as the aircraft is per-
forming a southbound maneuver. The maneuver aligns the
aircraft with the runway to avoid inadvertent penetration
of the Tampa Class B surface area to the northwest. Of
collisions between manned aircraft, 88% occur when at
least one aircraft is maneuvering (Morris, 2005); therefore,
an aircraft maneuvering for approach in this area may be
particularly vulnerable.
Heliport activity in downtown Tampa
Twelve UAS detections occurred within proximity to
three heliports in downtown Tampa, including Tampa
Figure 9. Detected flight time as proportion of maximum flight time specification by platform. Note: one Inspire 2 flight detection time represented 206%
of reported maximum specification. Depiction of this outlier was capped at 120% on this graphic.
Table 1






Inspire 1 233.0 (21.6%) 233.0 (21.6%) 124.5 1080
Inspire 2 424.8 (26.2%) 121.0 (7.5%) 872.3 1620
Matrice 200 567.0 (24.9%) 221.0 (9.7%) 619.3 2280
MavicPro 157.1 (9.7%) 60.0 (3.7%) 273.3 1620
Phantom 3 Std 49.9 (3.3%) 27.0 (1.8%) 50.9 1500
Phantom 3 SE 129.5 (8.9%) 62.0 (2.3%) 169.6 1500
Phantom 4 161.9 (7.7%) 53.0 (3.7%) 224.9 1680
Phantom 4 Pro 353.6 (9.0%) 186.0 (2.9%) 516.4 1800
Spark 67.6 (7.0%) 49.0 (5.1%) 64.8 960
Unknown 342.3 340.5 99.6 N/A
Note. All data depicted in seconds. Maximum values derived from DJI
product specifications website by platform. Maximum values were
presumed to equate to battery exhaustion, in which controllability and/or
safe flight was compromised. When multiple maximum values were
provided based on varying flight conditions, the longest duration was
selected.
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Figure 10. (Top) AeroScope detection data (Tampa, FL). Note: red pins represent individual UAS sortie detection logged by the AeroScope device during
the collection period. Numerals adjacent to the pins represent rounded altitude information in hundreds of feet. All aerodromes within the detection area are
labeled with their respective ICAO identifiers. Airports are represented by a green aircraft symbol, seaplane bases with a blue aircraft symbol, and heliports
with a red helicopter symbol. The AeroScope sensor is depicted as a white target in the center of the graphic. (Left) Heat map of AeroScope UAS detections.
Image courtesy of FLYMOTION. Used with permission.
32 R. J. Wallace et al. / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering
Figure 11. Detected UAS activity by location type.
Figure 12. AeroScope detection data overlaid on Tampa Terminal Area Chart. Numerals adjacent to the pins represent rounded altitude information in
hundreds of feet (MLS). Heliports are depicted with a red helicopter symbol. The AeroScope sensor is depicted as a white target in the center of the graphic.
Suspected airspace violations are identified by their record number, altitude, and pointer to detection location.
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General Hospital (61FL), WFLA-TV 8 (FL70), and Teco
Plaza (54FL). Results are displayed in Figure 15. Although
DJI incorporates geofencing within a 0.10 SM radius
around each of these locations, they are only Warning
Zones, which provides an informational prompt to the UAS
operator but does not restrict flight activity. It is also
Figure 13. Visual approach path to Peter O. Knight (TPF) Runway 18. Yellow line extends from threshold (Runway 18 has a displaced threshold) along
runway orientation to 1.4 SM. At the northern end of the yellow line, an aircraft performing a standard 3˚approach would be at approximately 387 ft AGL,
based on trigonometric calculations. Assuming detected activity is representative of normal UAS flight operations north of Harbour Island, this condition
would likely put approaching aircraft coming into Runway 18 at a risk of midair collision.
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notable that the center point for each of these geofenced
areas does not necessarily correspond to the location of the
helipad, which may allow unmanned aircraft and helicopter
activity to come into proximity before UAS operators
become aware of the potential hazard.
Geofencing
Based on the collected data, no flights were detected within
Restricted Zones and two flights were detected in Authori-
zation Zones, which represents 0.7% of the overall data-
set (N 5 258). Of the detected dataset, exactly 50.0%
(n 5 129) of detections occurred within Enhanced Warning
Zones (11 overlapped between the TPA and TPF Enhanced
Warning Zones but were only counted once). Nearly 88.0%
of all detections (n 5 227) occurred inside of one or more
Warning Zones.
These findings indicate that while only 0.7% of UAS
operators actively overrode geofence protections, at
least 50.0% (n 5 129) of operators acknowledged
warning messages but elected to continue flying in spite
of area hazards. An overview of detected sUAS flights
overlaid against DJI Restricted Zones is presented in
Figure 16.
Figure 14. Peter O. Knight (TPF) airport 3˚ visual approach profile with UAS activity plotted within ¡10˚ lateral approach wedge. Displayed in lateral
0.25 SM increments from 1.0 to 2.25 SM lateral and 100 ft vertical increments, charted in feet. Orange trend line represents 3˚visual glideslope, with blue
plots indicating detected UAS activity. *UAS altitude adjusted based on TPF airport elevation to display in AGL.
Figure 15. Heliport activity in downtown Tampa. AeroScope detections presented as pins with adjacent numerals representing altitude in hundreds of feet
MSL. Heliports are represented with a red helicopter symbol, overlaid on helipad location. Green circles represent DJI warning zone geofencing, based on
information derived from DJI (n.d.) on April 3, 2018.
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Conclusions
UAS Flight Locations
Data suggested that operators favored conducting flights
in proximity to single-family homes and commercial or
industrial locations. It is not an unreasonable assertion to
suggest that operators are flying in direct proximity to their
own homes. Similarly, operators are also conducting flights
from commercial or industrial locations, usually from parking
lots or other open areas. Parks did not seem to be as popular a
flight location as researchers originally anticipated, with only
4% (n5 11) of detections originating in those areas. Perhaps
the most unexpected finding was the 8% (n 5 21) of flights
carried out over public roadways.
UAS Operator Behavior
The collected data allude to several UAS operator
characteristics:
UAS operations altitude
At least 18.2% (n 5 47) of flights were conducted above
400 ft AGL. This finding indicates that many operators are
ignorant of or willfully non-compliant with either 14 CFR
107.51(b) regulations or AC 91-57A(C1) Sec 6(e) guidance,
which limits UAS flight altitude to less than 400 ft AGL.
The detection of 11.6% (n 5 30) of UAS flights above
500 ft AGL is worrisome, as such operations are likely to
cause interference with manned operations—particularly in
congested airspace.
Figure 16. AeroScope detection data overlaid on Tampa Terminal Area Chart with DJI geofencing Restricted, Authorization, Enhanced Warning, and
Warning Zones. Restricted Zones appear in red, Authorization Zones in orange, Enhanced Warning Zones in cyan, and Warning Zones in green. Geofencing
data derived from DJI (n.d.) on April 3, 2018.
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UAS operations date/time
Most midair collisions between manned aircraft occurred
on warm weekends, during daylight hours and under visual
meteorological conditions (FAA, n.d.c; Morris, 2005). Forty-
seven percent of UAS detections occurred on Saturday or
Sunday under visual meteorological conditions. While not
definitive, the preliminary data suggest the risk of collisions
between manned and unmanned aircraft may also be higher
on fair-weather weekend days.
Data showed that UAS operators are conducting flights
at nearly all hours of the day—in many cases breaking civil
twilight limitations. The data suggest the majority of UAS
flights tend to favor times between 3:00pm and 9:00pm,
with operations peaking between 7:00pm and 8:00pm.
UAS operations duration
The collected data suggested that operators generally
flew for durations between 1 and 3 min, with 64% of flights
lasting 1 min or less. This is surprisingly short, considering
that even the least capable detected UAS had an endurance
of 16 min. It is possible this finding could be in error, if
several sUAS platforms moved outside of the AeroScope’s
electronic line of sight before the conclusion of their flights.
Aeronautical Impact
For the purpose of this study, potential regulatory
violations were evaluated within the context of 14 CFR
107, since these regulatory provisions incorporate a risk-
based approach to operational limitations.
Strong evidence suggests that many detected UAS
operations were in violation of one or more provisions of
14 CFR 107, or otherwise conducted flights in a manner that
presented a potential hazard to manned flight operations. At
least 16.3% of flights (n 5 42) appeared to violate daylight
operation limitations prescribed in 14 CFR 107.29, by
conducting flights during nighttime hours. Similarly, 18.2%
of flights (n5 47) were flown in excess of the 400 ft altitude
limitation prescribed for sUAS under 14 CFR 107.51. Four
UAS operations were found to have penetrated either the
Tampa International Airport Class B Surface Area or Shelf,
violating 14 CFR 107.41 provisions. Three of the four flights
in Class B airspace far exceeded 1,000 ft AGL. Based on the
assessed factors, the authors conclude that in the short, 19-
day sampling there could have been as many as 93 potential
violations of 14 CFR 107. The authors reiterate that this
summation of potential violations may include authorized
activities that comply with Part 107 operational waivers, Part
333 exemptions/Certificates of Authorization, or 14 CFR
101 provisions. Nevertheless, the quantity of potential
violations highlights an elevated risk of interference with
manned aircraft operations.
The findings indicate a strong likelihood of potential
interference with manned aircraft operations. UAS penetra-
tion into the Tampa International Class B Surface Area and
surrounding shelf presented a distinct hazard to aircraft
inbound, outbound, and transitioning through this densely
trafficked environment. Moreover, significant UAS activity
along the northern shoreline of Harbour Island induced
potentially serious hazards to aircraft inbound to the Peter O.
Knight airfield via the Runway 18 visual approach.
Finally, the quantity, proximity, and altitude of UAS
operations near downtown Tampa heliports are also
problematic, indicating a clear collision hazard for low-
altitude rotorcraft operations.
Geofencing
The data suggested that DJI’s Restricted Zones and
Authorization Zones offered reasonable protection against
intrusion with no penetrations of Restricted Zones and only
two intrusions into Authorization Zones.
Conversely, the data suggested that at least 50.0% of
detected flight operators acknowledged Enhanced Warning
Zone messages but elected to continue their UAS flight.
Similarly, 88.0% of operators elected to continue UAS
flight into Warning Zones despite user interface warnings
alerting them to local aeronautical hazards. The authors
believe this finding highlights a deficiency in the
aeronautical decision-making of detected sUAS operators.
Moreover, this operator behavior suggests that geofencing
protections are only effective if they impose some level of
restriction upon the flight.
Recommendations
Align Operational Rules
The authors assert the large numbers of potential
violations assessed under 14 CFR 107 rules are indicative
of growing, systemic risks in the National Airspace System
(NAS) posed by unmanned aircraft operations. Based on
the high proportion of hobbyist registrations in the sample
area, the authors suspect that the majority of detected sUAS
operations represent hobbyist activity or flights not other-
wise carried out under 14 CFR 107 provisions.
During the study, it was not possible to definitively
distinguish between flights carried out under 14 CFR 107
rules versus flights carried out under 14 CFR 101 provi-
sions. According to the FAA, the establishment of 14 CFR
107 ‘‘addresses [the provisions]…to maintain the safety of
the NAS and ensure that small UAS do not pose a threat to
national security’’ (FAA, n.d.b, p. 10). The FAA’s risk-based
approach to establishing specific operational restrictions
under Part 107 is not replicated to the same extent under
14 CFR 101. With the exception of UAS weight, right of
way, and aerodrome proximity rules, the FAA defers autho-
rity to establish operational limitations on model aircraft
operators based on safety guidelines of nationwide commu-
nity-based organizations.
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Even if sUAS operations were compliant with Part 101
rules, a notable percentage of the study’s detected flights
presented a significant risk to manned flight operations. The
authors suggest that as currently written and implemented,
the provisions of 14 CFR 101 do not adequately ensure
safety for manned aircraft operations conducted in the NAS.
For these reasons, the authors recommend Congress
consider revocation of the preamble contained in Section
336(a) of the FAA Modernization & Reform Act of 2012,
which would allow the FAA to codify and impose reason-
able operational limitations on hobbyist and model aircraft
activity to protect the safety of the NAS. Indeed, this
recommendation is a moderated solution when compared
to the legislative agenda of other advocacy groups. Both
the Commercial Drone Alliance and the Air Line Pilots
Association have called for wholesale revocation of the
entirety of Section 336 (Air Line Pilots Association, 2018;
Commercial Drone Alliance, 2018). Even the Academy of
Model Aeronautics (2018) acknowledges the limitations
associated with Section 336 provisions, stating that ‘‘some
tweaks to Section 336 may be needed to clarify who the
provision does and does not cover’’ (p. 1).
Succinctly, the authors ascertain the existing provisions
of 14 CFR 101 do not provide adequate protection to
manned aircraft operations within the NAS. The sample
dataset indicates serious potential risks exist for manned
aircraft, based on flights likely carried out by sUAS
operators under 14 CFR 101 rules. In the absence of further
geofencing, regulation, or other safety provisions, it is
highly likely that sUAS operations will continue to repre-
sent the proverbial ‘‘Wild West’’ of aviation. As sUAS
operations continue to proliferate into the NAS, the spill-
over of non-compliant sUAS flights into airspace tradi-
tionally occupied by manned aircraft will likely exacerbate
collision risks unless immediate mitigation efforts are taken.
Limitations
This study had several identifiable limitations. Unfor-
tunately, the AeroScope was only able to detect DJI sUAS
platforms within the electronic line of sight of the detec-
tion device. Skylogic Research (2017) estimates that DJI
platforms comprise approximately 72% of the small UAS
market. In the event a detected UAS moved outside of
the electronic line of sight of the AeroScope, the device
may have created a separate record of the flight, possibly
skewing detection data. The authors did not evaluate or
adjust detection data based on these conditions. Addi-
tionally, the AeroScope is not yet configured to detect all
models of DJI platforms. For example, the DJI Matrice 100
displays as an ‘‘unknown’’ platform type.
Several UAS detections appeared to be violations of
established UAS regulations contained in 14 CFR 107
or 14 CFR 101(E). While such prima facie detections
may appear to be violations, it is possible that operators
exercised authority under an approved Section 333 exemp-
tion with accompanying Certificate of Waiver or Authori-
zation, or via operational waivers described in 14 CFR
107(D). This study did not assess waivers or other methods
of UAS regulatory compliance.
It should be noted that UAS operator behavior in the
sample location may not necessarily be representative of
operator behavior in other locations. Moreover, the authors
did not assess how UAS operator behavior changed based
on seasonal weather or other temporal factors.
Future Research
The authors intend to expand their assessment of
unmanned aircraft activity to additional airfields to further
refine results. Future research efforts will focus on collect-
ing data in proximity to airports in Class C, D, and Surface
Class E airspace.
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